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The Japanese Law of Fiduciaries from 
Comparative and Transnational 
Perspectives 
Masayuki Tamaruya* & Mutsuhiko Yukioka** 
 
Japan occupies a vantage point to observe the intersecting theories of fiduciary law and 
transnational legal ordering. Having modernized its legal system by introducing western law since 
the late nineteenth century, Japan possesses a body of law that have been influenced by comparatively 
diverse sources including both civil law and common law traditions, as well as traditional value 
system. Japan also has a complex past in the region, initially acting as a colonial power to impose 
its modernized law onto Korea and Taiwan, then as a leading economy in the post-war years, 
though the past quarter century has witnessed its struggle. Such diversity and dynamics have affected 
the evolution of fiduciary norms in Japan and in East Asia, and the main part of this Article will 
trace the historical progression. In Japan and major East Asian jurisdictions, although the terms 
“fiduciary” and “duty of loyalty” were not part of the legal lexicon until recent decades, the basic 
notion of duty of care and the context-specific regulation of conflicted transaction were part of the 
law. The fiduciary norms evolved as their multiple strands of sources interacted with each other, or 
even came into conflict with each other. The ever-increasing economic interactions increased the pace 
and dynamics of this process, and regional and global financial crises added to the sense of urgency. 
This Article will use the framework of transnational legal ordering to understand the complex 
evolution of fiduciary norms in Japan, East Asia and beyond. 
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The notion of loyalty is hardly new to Japan. In fact, two strands of loyalty 
formed the core value system that was sanctioned by the premodern authority that 
ruled from 1603 to 1867. These loyalty norms were status-based: one was termed 
ko (孝), loyalty to family elders, and the other was chu (忠), loyalty to authority. The 
conventional wisdom is that this hierarchical social structure was defined by the 
Neo-Confucianism originally developed in China.1 Recent academic research has 
cast doubt on these assumptions, however, suggesting that the rulers and thinkers 
of the time did not simply import this attractive but dangerous body of thought.2 
These status-based loyalty norms are seldom articulated in modern legislation 
or legal scholarship after the introduction of Western legal thought in the late 
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, they played an important role in Japanese social 
and economic life.3 Toward the end of the twentieth century, these norms were 
invoked as an important source of employee loyalty to corporations.4 They shaped 
the operating norm of the company as a community of employees, in which the 
employees’ interests could exert an influence on corporate management that 
sometimes exceeded the ownership interest of the shareholders.5 Whether this 
Japanese style of management is the continuance of premodern thought and 
practice6 or reflects a pragmatic adjustment to the necessities of modern society7 is 
contested.8 Nevertheless, it created a tension with the modern reform that 
 
1. See, e.g., Michael Young & Constance Hamilton, Historical Introduction to the Japanese Legal System, 
in JAPAN BUSINESS LAW GUIDE ¶ 1–370 (1988). 
2. HIROSHI WATANABE, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1600-190188-91 
(David Noble trans., 2012). 
3. JUN-ICHI KYOGOKU, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF JAPAN 41–44 (Nobutaka Ike trans. 
1987).  
4. Id. at 64–66. For a recent example, see, FUJIO MITARAI & UICHIRO NIWA, 
会社は誰のために [WHO IS THE COMPANY FOR?] 97–105 (2006). 
5. Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 20 (1990); 
Curtis Milhaupt, Takeover Law and Managerial Incentives in the United States and Japan, in ENTERPRISE LAW: 
CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE US AND JAPAN 177, 182 (Zen’ichi Shishido ed., 2014). 
6. See, e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN, THE JAPANESE FACTORY: ASPECTS OF ITS SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION 95–98 (1958). 
7. See, e.g., JOHN BUCHANAN, DOMINIC HEESANG CHAI & SIMON DEAKIN, HEDGE FUND 
ACTIVISM IN JAPAN: THE LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 130 (2014). 
8. For a literature that takes the middle ground, see, for example, KUNIO ODAKA, JAPANESE 
MANAGEMENT: A FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS 39–48 (1986). 
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emphasized the primacy of the shareholders’ interests and monitored by outside 
directors on their behalf. 
In what follows, we will trace the evolution of fiduciary norms9 since the 
Japanese reception of the modern legal system during the latter half of the 
nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century. The duty-of-care provisions 
and regulation of conflicted transactions were introduced into the Civil Code, the 
Commercial Codes, and the Trusts Act, which laid the foundation for further 
transnationalization (Part I).10 The post–World War II years witnessed a greater 
influence of American law, which involved the transplant of the duty-of-loyalty 
provision, portending a gradual shift in the forms of fiduciary norm from a rule-
based to standard-based format. However, the American-style open-ended fiduciary 
standard also raised more fundamental questions: Who do the fiduciaries serve and 
how are they to be monitored? These questions were among the most contested 
grounds of debate in a series of reforms toward the end of the twentieth century 
(Part II). Nevertheless, since the 1990s, Japanese lawyers and policy makers have 
demonstrated a greater willingness to use fiduciary terms and to embrace fiduciary 
initiatives overseas (Part III). 
A historical review sheds light on a number of factors and mechanisms that 
led to the reception of fiduciary norms and the synchronization of domestic and 
international norms.11 However, one can discern occasional divergence between the 
overseas fiduciary initiatives and the motives of the domestic policy makers that 
raise questions as to the level of convergence (Part IV(1)).12 In fact, this co-existence 
of synchronization and divergence has hardly been unique to Japan, as can be seen 
when the scope of observation is extended to some of the major jurisdictions in 
East Asia. On the one hand, the one-and-a-half centuries of Japanese experience 
has served as the basis for the emergence of a transnational legal order. At the same 
time, the unique socio-economic conditions and the desire to exploit comparative 
advantage in the increasingly global market economy have created motives for each 
jurisdiction, both to introduce internationally prevailing fiduciary norms and diverge 
from them. The growing importance of the region, both in economic and political 
terms, also means that such disjunctions have the potential to influence the 
transnational evolution of fiduciary orders (Part IV(2)). 
 
9. In this article, “fiduciary norm” is used as a generic category that includes rules, principles, 
and customary notions that relevant parties perceive as binding, though not necessarily legally 
enforceable. Substantively, it can include both specific doctrines, such as those concerning duty of 
loyalty and duty of care, and broader normative statements, such as who the fiduciaries are, who the 
fiduciary should serve, and how any given rules should be enforced. 
10. Thilo Kuntz, Transnational Fiduciary Law: Spaces and Elements, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L 
TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 41, 57 (2020). 
11. For an analytical framework, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL 
BUSINESS REGULATION 15–26 (2000). 
12. Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANS- NATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 3, 55–63 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
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I. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODES: PRE-WWII RECEPTION 
The modern layers of Japanese fiduciary norms were laid down by the French-
inspired Civil Code (1896) and the German-modeled Commercial Code (1899).13 
Although the term “fiduciary” did not immediately become part of the Japanese 
legal lexicon, these codes contained a series of rules that were equivalent to the 
present-day fiduciary principles. Placed at the core of the Japanese law of fiduciaries 
is an agent’s obligation to manage a principal’s affairs carefully and faithfully.14 Civil 
Code § 644 imposes on an agent “a duty to carry out the work of the agency 
following the aim of the agency and with the care of a faithful manager.”15 This 
duty-of-care provision applies, mutatis mutandis, to partners—kumiaiin,16 guardians—
kōken),17 and executors—igon shikkōsha under the Civil Code,18 and extends to 
corporate directors under the Commercial Code.19 
As introduced in those statutes, the fiduciary regulation of conflict transactions 
was largely rule-based in form. The Civil Code agency provisions contained specific 
prohibitions on self-dealing and representation of both parties to the same 
transaction.20 Similarly, context-specific regulations of conflict-of-interest 
transactions applied to guardians21 and charity directors22 under the Civil Code, and 
to commercial agents23 and corporate directors24 under the Commercial Code. 
The Commercial Code also prescribed the corporate governance structure for 
for-profit corporations that paralleled the German-style two-tier board (duale 
Führungsstruktur). Just as the German supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) provides 
monitoring of the managing board (Vorstand), Japanese statutory auditors 
(kansayaku) were expected to monitor the business decisions and accounting 
practices of the directors (torishimariyaku).25 Herman Roesler, the Code’s German 
architect, referred to not just the German example, but also French and British 
 
13. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] 1896, no. 89 (Japan); SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.] 1899, no. 48 (Japan). 
14. J. Mark Ramseyer & Masayuki Tamaruya, Fiduciary Principles in Japanese Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 643, 643 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
15. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] 1896, art. 644 (Japan). 
16. Id. art. 671. 
17. Id. art. 869. 
18. Id. art. 1012. 
19. The relevant Commercial Code provision was introduced as Article 164, Paragraph 2 by 
Law No. 73 of 1911; renumbered as Article 254, Paragraph 2 by Law No. 72 of 1938; and renumbered 
as Article 254, Paragraph 3 by Law No. 167 of 1950. It is now superseded by Kaishahō [Companies 
Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 355 (Japan). 
20. MINPŌ [CIV. C.] 1896, art. 108 (Japan). 
21. Id. art. 860. 
22. Id. art. 57. 
23. SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.] 1899, no. 48 (Japan). 
24. Id. art. 264–65.  
25. The directors were formally constituted as a board through revision to Commercial Code 
arts. 259 et seq, by Law No. 167 of 1950, and the statutory auditors by revision to Kabushiki Gaisha 
no Kansa tō ni kansuru Shōhō no Tokurei ni kansuru Hōritsu [Special Exceptions to Commercial Code 
Concerning Audit, etc. Act], Law No. 22 of 1974, §§ 18 et seq, by Law No. 62 of 1993. 
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legislation, making sure that the Code match the needs of the time in Japan.26 The 
Japanese statutory auditors’ position, however, was weaker than that of their 
German counterpart in that, although they had power to require directors to 
produce accounting documents for review and conduct inquiries on their business 
execution, they lacked the power to appoint or remove directors.27 
On top of the civil law basis of Japanese private law, common-law trust was 
introduced by the Trust Act of 1922.28 Under the Act, the trustee has the duty of 
carrying out “the work of the trusteeship following the aim of the trust and with the 
care of a faithful manager,”29 a provision that shows close parallels with the language 
of Civil Code § 644. The agency-based regulation is extended to prohibition of the 
trustee engaging in self-dealing under any name involving any proprietary or 
personal rights.30 While being careful to ensure consistency with the Civil Code, the 
drafter of the Trust Act incorporated certain remedies against breach of trust that 
tracked the common-law approach, which are more extensive than those available 
for agency arrangements.31 
Thus, by the 1930s, fiduciary principles were prescribed in separate codes 
drawn from different legal traditions. There was no general duty-of-loyalty 
provision, and the provisions took a mostly rule-based format by listing conflicted 
transactions that were prohibited unless there was specific authorization or unless 
an independent representative was appointed. It should be noted that this was not 
unique to Japan at the time. English fiduciary law had long been largely rule-based, 
using no-profit, no-conflict formulas.32 The general formulation of the duty of 
loyalty in the U.S. became broadly accepted only in 1930s, after the publication of 
Austin W. Scott’s Treatise on Trusts and the Restatement on Trusts, in which he served 
as a reporter.33 In Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions, more systematic 
consideration of fiduciary law came later in the twentieth century.34 
The Japanese experience suggests that the divide between the civil-law 
formulation and the common-law formulation is not irreconcilable, recognition of 
 
26. Haruhito Takada & Masamichi Yamamoto, The “Roesler Model” Corporation: Roesler’s Draft of 
the Japanese Commercial Code and the Roots of Japanese Corporate Governance, 45 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
JAPANISCHES RECHT [JOURNAL OF JAPANESE LAW] 45 (2018). 
27. Tsukasa Miyajima, 監査機構 [Auditing Structure], in 昭和商法学史 [HISTORY OF 
COMMERCIAL LAW STUDIES IN SHOWA PERIOD] 389, 391–96 (Yasuichciro Kurasawa & Takayasu 
Okushima eds., 1996); Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of 
Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 348 (2005). 
28. Shintakuhō [Trust Act], Law No. 62 of 1922 (Japan). 
29. Id. art. 20.  
30.   Id. art. 22. 
31.   Id. art. 31. 
32. Aberdeen Rly Co v. Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 463 [1843-60] All ER Rep 249; Bray v. Ford 
[1896] AC 44, [1895-9] All ER Rep 1009, 73 LT 609. 
33. Austin W. Scott, The Trustee’s Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARV. L. REV. 521 (1936); Austin W. Scott, 
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1266 (1931). 
34. PAUL D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 1 (THE LAW BOOK CO. LTD. 2017) (1977); 
MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORM ANCE OF NON-
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 1–3 (Hart Publ’g 2011) (2007). 
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which could lay the foundation for further transnational fiduciary ordering. 
However, as will be seen in the next part, the reformulation of fiduciary concept 
under the American notion of duty of loyalty posed a major challenge of 
transplantation haunting the Japanese lawyers for almost half a century. The 
questions as to whom the fiduciaries are to serve and who are to monitor the 
fiduciaries also proved controversial, particularly in the Japanese law of 
corporation.= 
II. AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND CHALLENGES: POST-WWII CHANGES 
A. Coming of Duty of Loyalty 
After World War II, the influence of American law became pronounced. A 
number of New Deal-inspired laws were introduced including an antitrust law, 
securities law, and labor standards law, as well as a new Constitution. Along with 
these laws, duty-of-loyalty provisions were introduced as a standard-based fiduciary 
norm. In 1950, the Commercial Code was amended to introduce § 254-2, which 
provided the following: 
A director owes a duty to obey the provisions of the laws, the articles of 
incorporation, and the decisions of the general meeting of shareholders, and a duty 
to carry out their work loyally in the interests of the corporation.35 
In later years, the Securities Investment Trust Act was amended in 1967 to 
impose a similar duty of loyalty on the manager of securities investment trusts to 
the trust beneficiaries,36 and the Investment Advisors Act was introduced in 1986 
to impose a duty of loyalty on investment advisors to their clients.37 
The transplant of the duty-of-loyalty provisions was not completed in one 
day.38 In fact, these provisions were rarely invoked in court, and when they were, 
they invariably accompanied a reference to the general duty of care of faithful 
managers.39 However, it is not correct to say Japanese lawyers or courts resisted the 
duty of loyalty as a matter of principle. Rather, the court expanded the prohibition 
of conflict-of-interest transactions without relying on the duty-of-loyalty provision. 
 
35. SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.] art. 254-2, later renumbered art. 254-3, was superseded by KAISHAHŌ 
[Companies Act] Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 355. 
36. Shōken Tōshi Shintaku hō [Securities Investment Trust Act] Law No. 198 of 1951, art. 71, 
inserted by Law No. 106 of 1967. 
37. Investment Advisors on Securities Regulation Act, Law No. 74 of 1986, art. 21, repealed by 
Law No. 66 of 2007 and consolidated into the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Law No. 25 
of 1948. 
38. Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty 
in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 900–01 (2003). 
39. The duty of loyalty was not invoked as independent ground of liability for the first time 
until 1989 in Takada v. Nihon setsubi, K.K., 835 KINYU SHOJI HANREI 23 [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 26, 
1989. See text accompanying notes 113-114. 
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In Oe Industrial v. Business Consultancies (1963),40 the Supreme Court invalidated 
a transaction between the plaintiff company and the defendant on the basis that the 
director who represented the plaintiff company abused his agency authority. The 
transaction in question involved the sale of corporate property. This was formally 
within the director’s authority but in fact was entered into with the collusion of the 
defendant to reap an unfair profit. While the lower court had interpreted the 
Commercial Code’s prohibition of conflict-of-interest transactions narrowly and 
had upheld the transaction so long as the director had acted within his authority, 
the Supreme Court held that if the other party was aware of the underlying self-
interest of the director, the company could avoid the transaction constituting an 
abuse of agency authority following case law doctrine under the Civil Code. 
In San’ei Electronics v. Japan Victor (1968),41 the Supreme Court expanded the 
prohibition of self-dealing by overruling its earlier ruling that narrowly construed 
the Commercial Code’s prohibition of self-dealing as encompassing only direct 
transactions between the company and the putative director. In this case, the 
plaintiff company’s director had represented the company to assume a debt owed 
by the director to the defendant. The Commercial Code had required the board’s 
approval when a director sells his property to the corporation, borrows money from 
the company, or otherwise deals with the company on behalf of himself or a third 
party, but had not prescribed indirect transactions such as the assumption of a 
director’s debt by the company. Although some commentators feared that 
broadening the grounds of invalidity could cause disruption to business 
transactions, there was a growing awareness of the need to protect the company 
from disloyal directors. The Supreme Court took the broader construction, and later 
the Commercial Code was amended in 1981 to explicitly prohibit indirect forms of 
self-dealing transactions.42 
While the Japanese courts have used various doctrines to regulate conflict-of-
interest transactions, they did not see the need to treat the duty of loyalty as a ground 
for liability distinct from the duty of care. The Supreme Court thus held in 1970: 
Article 254-2 of the Commercial Code [duty of loyalty] merely clarifies and 
details the duty of a faithful manager established in Article 254(3) of the same Code 
and Article 644 of the Civil Code. It does not impose a separate, higher duty than 
the general duty of faithful management required of all agents.43 
 This approach meant that the Japanese courts were slow to develop a more 
specific duty-of-loyalty doctrine, such as corporate opportunity, or an extensive 
remedy, such as disgorgement of profit. 
 
40. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 5, 1963, Sho 35 (e) no. 1388, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBA NSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 909 (Japan).  
41. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 25, 1968, Sho 42 (e) no. 1327, 22 SAIKŌ SAIB ANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 3511 (Japan).  
42. Kaishahō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 356(1), 365(1) (Japan).  
43. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 24, 1970, Sho 41 (e) no. 444, 24 SAIKŌ SAIB ANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 625 (Japan).  
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B. Loyalty to Whom? 
By the 1970s, Japan was the world’s second-largest economy. Its growth 
attracted international attention to some of the unique features of Japanese 
corporate management and labor relationships, including lifetime employment and 
a steep seniority wage progression that secured loyalty to companies as communities 
of employees.44 The boards of directors were almost exclusively composed of senior 
managers who had devoted their whole careers to their companies as employees.45 
Shareholders, on the other hand, appeared content to have their financial interests 
subordinated to other stakeholders’ interests, justifying their investments in terms 
of wider business interests.46 
As Japanese economic growth threatened American dominance, tensions 
arose on the corporate governance front. To Americans’ eyes, the Japanese 
corporate sector was closed to outsiders and lacking in transparency; in terms of 
American standards, Japan’s post-war corporate governance was inadequate. As 
Curtis Milhaupt summarizes the sentiment: 
The market for corporate control was not active during Japan’s post-war high-
growth period. In the post-war corporate governance regime, publicly traded firms 
were typically affiliated with a corporate group (keiretsu) with a major bank at the 
center. Group-affiliated firms cross-held shares of their affiliates, forming stable, 
friendly investor relationships involving significant percentages of the public float. 
Investor activism was rare and hostile takeover activity was condemned as 
antithetical to Japanese business norms, which conceptualizes the firm as a 
community of employees rather than an assemblage of financial assets to be bought 
and sold.47 
This was the lesson that an American barbarian learned at the Japanese 
corporate gates in 1989.48 T. Boone Pickens, who had earlier contributed to the 
American law of corporate takeover in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co. (1985),49 acquired 
20.2% of Koito Manufacturing Co. and demanded that the Toyota affiliate elect a 
director of his recommendation.50 For Koito, and most of the Japanese general 
 
44. ABEGGLEN, supra note 6, at 8, 39–40; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. [OECD], Manpower 
Policy in Japan: Reviews of Manpower and Social Policies Number, 11 OECD, 7, 9–26 (1973); EZRA F. VOGEL, 
JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 133 (1979). 
45. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 27, at 348–49. 
46. See, e.g., Gen Goto, Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & 
VENTURE CAP. L. 125, 142–43 (2014); Bruce Aronson, Japanese Corporate Governance Reform: A 
Comparative Perspective, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 85, 95 (2015). For a historical account of the shareholding 
structure in Japan, see Julian Franks et al., The Ownership of Japanese Corporations in the 20th Century, 27 
REV. FIN. STUD. 2580 (2014). 
47. Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 182. 
48. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR 
NABISCO (Harper & Row, Publishers 1990). 
49. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
50. 米Ｍ＆Ａの大物ピケンズ氏筆頭株主に――小糸製株２０％を取得 [Mr. Pickens, A 
Major Figure in American M&A Becomes the Largest Shareholder—20% of Koito Shares Acquired], NIHON 
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public, Pickens’s demand was nothing but another example of “greenmail” to extort 
extravagant cash from Toyota. Hiroshi Okuda, who would later become the CEO 
of Toyota Motors, negotiated hard with Pickens on behalf of Toyota and Koito. 
Koichi Kusano, who is now Justice of the Supreme Court, represented Koito as its 
attorney.51 Ultimately, Pickens retreated from the fight in 1990, handing over the 
shares back to the Azabu Building, a shady speculator entity who Koito claimed was 
the beneficial owner of shares held by Pickens.52 
In parallel, a government-level negotiation known as the U.S.-Japan Structural 
Impediment Initiative was under way. In order to alleviate the mounting trade 
imbalance, the U.S. Government demanded that Japan remove a wide range of 
trading impediments, which included corporate governance issues. Following the 
negotiations, a number of reforms were introduced to expand shareholders’ rights. 
The 1993 revision of the Commercial Code and related statutes included, for 
example, provisions to expand the shareholders’ right to review corporate books;53 
to make shareholders’ derivative suits more accessible;54 and to enhance the 
independence of statutory auditors.55 The introduction of outside directors was 
discussed during the negotiations but did not become part of the reform package, 
in anticipation of resistance from industry. This became a hotly debated issue from 
the late 1990s on. 
Not all Japanese were hostile to American influence. Since the early 1970s, 
Akio Takeuchi and Hideo Tanaka, colleagues at Tokyo University who had shared 
time at Harvard Law School, used the American law as a model, arguing that 
derivative suits, class action and other measures should be introduced and expanded 
to invigorate private citizens’ efforts to enforce the law.56 Takeuchi led academic 
opinion in the run-up to the 1993 revision, advocating law reform to enhance the 
use of derivative action.57 For academics, foreign pressure was even felt to be useful 
to draw concessions from opposing business interests.58 
 
KEIZAI SHINBUN 1 (Apr. 2, 1989) (Japan). For a general account of the dispute, see BUCHANAN, supra 
note 7, at 128–30. 
51. See KOICHI KUSANO, 会社法の正義 [JUSTICE OF CORPORATE LAW] 169–72 (2011). 
52. T. Boone Pickens, The Heck with Japanese Business: Why I’m Not Interested in Trying to Compete in 
a Cartel System, WASH. POST C1 (Apr. 28, 1991); 小糸製ピケンズ氏撤退を歓迎—麻布
建の動き焦点に [Koito-Seisakusho Welcome Mr. Pickens’ Retreat—Focus Shift to Azabu Buildings Co.], 
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN 9 (Apr. 30, 1991) (Japan). 
53. SHŌHŌ [COMM. C.] art. 293-6, as amended by Law No 62 of 1993. (Japan). 
54. Id. art. 267(4), 268-2(1), as amended by Law No 62 of 1993. 
55. Kabushiki Gaisha no Kansa tō ni kansuru Shōhō no Tokurei ni kansuru Hōritsu 
[Commercial Code Special Provisions on Company Auditor etc. Act] Law No. 22 of 1974, art. 18(1), as 
amended by Law No. 62 of 1993. 
56. Their arguments were developed in a series of articles, which were subsequently 
incorporated in a book: HIDEO TANAKA & AKIO TAKEUCHI, 法の実現における私人の役割 [THE 
ROLE OF PRIVATE PERSONS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT] (1987). 
57. Akio Takeuchi, 株主代表訴訟の活用と濫用防止[Enhancing the Use and Preventing the 
Abuse of Shareholder Derivative Action], 1329 SHOJI HOMU 34 (1993) (Japan). 
58. For the legislative background, see Yoshihiro Yamada, 
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Kusano—Koito’s attorney and now a Supreme Court Justice—was not, and 
is not, an enemy of the American-style corporate takeover either.59 Also a graduate 
of Harvard Law School, he had co-authored with his senior law firm partner a 
conference paper, noting with approval the shift in thinking among corporate 
managers who were beginning to “jettison the attitude to regard a corporate 
takeover as a vice in itself and to make use of it by viewing its economic benefits in 
a positive light.”60 He did note one difference in legal cultures: American directors’ 
sense of exclusive loyalty to the shareholder had facilitated the rise of the corporate 
takeover, whereas shareholder control had become irrelevant in Japan because of 
what he termed a “personified view” of the company.61 Kusano elaborated on this 
idea of corporate personification as follows: 
Corporate managers and employees do not regard their companies simply as 
a device to make profit for the benefit of shareholders, but something that must be 
defended as if it is their own han [藩: premodern governmental entity] or castle, 
where their own identity is at stake. The company behaves autonomously for its 
own purpose of growth and continuity.62 
One can detect a resonance of the status-based loyalty that was alluded to at 
the beginning of this article.63 According to Kusano, companies had become the 
sole object of loyalty after the destruction of the war and urbanization had deprived 
ie (イエ: household), mura (ムラ: local community), and kuni (クニ: nation) of such 
status. Perhaps because he wrote this just after he had successfully defended Koito 
against Pickens, Kusano sounds somewhat sympathetic to corporate 
personification. Nonetheless, he remained agnostic about whether this personified 
view of companies should be retained in any way or be jettisoned as a remnant of 
the premodern era and replaced by American-style shareholder primacy.64 
A review of post-war developments reveals that the notion of a duty of loyalty 
and ideas about shareholder-oriented corporate governance generated tensions and 
a heated reaction in Japan, particularly in the area of corporate law. However, the 
conceptual challenges and debates about stakeholders may have provided fertile 
grounds for further development. As will be seen in the next part, during the 1990s 
and onward, Japanese lawyers and policymakers began to use the broader notion of 
fiduciary duty, including the term “duty of loyalty,” beyond corporate law. We will 
 
会社法の選択―新しい社会の会社法を求めて [CORPORATE LAW’S CHOICE: SEARCHING FOR 
THE CORPORA 
TE LAW IN THE NEW ERA] 31, 137–47 (Masafumi Nakahigashi & Hideyuki Matsui eds., 2010). 
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that there is the open possibility that a hostile takeover can be successful”). 
60. Toshiro Nishimura & Koichi Kusano, International Economic Friction and Corporate Takeover, in 
INTERNATIONAL FRICTIONS—ITS LEGAL-CULTURAL BACKGROUND 92, 128–29 (Koichiro Fujikura 
& Ryuichi Nagao eds., 1989). 
61. Id. at 101–19. 
62. Koichi Kusano, 企業買収と擬人的企業観 [Corporate Takeover and Personified View of 
Companies], 108 (4-5) MINSHOHO ZASSHI 480, 481 (1993) (Japan). 
63. See text accompanying notes 1-8. 
64.   KUSANO, supra note 51, at 485. 
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also see greater synchronization between domestic law and overseas initiatives 
concerning fiduciary governance. 
III. GREATER TRANSNATIONALIZATION: REFORM SINCE THE 1990S 
In 1991, the Japanese bubble economy collapsed, leading to a decades-long 
recession. During this period, a number of events coalesced to bring about greater 
awareness among the Japanese of the broad notion of fiduciary principles and their 
transnational dimensions. First, because the Japanese model of economic growth 
was now in question, there was greater momentum for comprehensive reform, not 
just in corporate or market sectors but also in the non-profit and governmental 
regulatory sectors. Second, Japan was now in the midst of globalization. In 1998, 
the restriction on cross-border capital transactions was lifted and foreign exchange 
was opened up to all business entities. The deep economic recession brought about 
extensive corporate restructuring, both within Japan and across jurisdictional 
borders, in the form of both friendly purchases and hostile takeovers. Third, the 
Japanese Government initiated a financial reform in 1996 in an attempt to emulate 
the British Big Bang.65 Like their British and American counterparts, regulators and 
market players now faced financial conglomerates that operated globally under 
complex conflicts of interest and with the potential to abuse power within the 
deregulated market environment. 
A. Corporate Law 
Japanese corporate law in the 1990s and 2000s was characterized by extensive 
reform debates. Statutes were amended on an almost yearly basis, including the 
introduction of a freestanding Companies Act in 2005 to replace the corporate law 
section of the previous Commercial Code.66 Although most enabling reforms aimed 
at providing wider set of strategic choices to the managers were popular among the 
industry, some of the corporate governance reforms, and particularly those relating 
to the monitoring of fiduciaries, were highly contentious. 
After the 1993 revision of the Commercial Code reduced filing fees,67 
derivative suits increased in number: seventy-three such suits were pending before 
district courts around the country in 1993, a figure that had increased to 202 by 
2002.68 The decade following the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991 revealed 
a series of mismanagement and accounting irregularities in major Japanese 
companies. Increased prosecutorial action facilitated derivative suits that followed 
 
65. FINANCIAL SYSTEM WORKING GROUP OF THE ACTION PLAN COMMITTEE, ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL, REVITALIZING THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1996). 
66. Kaishahō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005 (Japan). 
67. Id. art. 874-4(1).  
68. Tomotaka Fujita, Transformation of the Management Liability Regime in Japan in the Wake of the 
1993 Revision, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 15, 17 tbl. (Hideki Kanda 
et al. eds., 2008). 
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on criminal indictment.69 Those derivative suits contributed to the development of 
case law on the range of duties owed by the directors of banking institutions and 
other for-profit companies. The figure then declined to as low of 102 in 2006, but 
it rose again, along with the growing attention to corporate governance issues, 
reaching 215 in 2011.70 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the issue of requiring outside/independent directors 
on boards was controversial in the debate on corporate governance in Japan.71 In 
the preparatory stage to the corporate law reforms of 2002, a proposal was made to 
require every company to have at least one outside director. Eventually, the proposal 
was defeated, and instead a new optional alternative corporate structure was created 
in which a company could replace the traditional statutory auditor system with a 
newly introduced three-committee system, which requires a majority of outside 
directors on each of the audit, nomination, and compensation.72 This governance 
structure was a legislative attempt to encourage Japanese companies to switch from 
the traditional management board model to an American-style monitoring model, 
in which the committees comprised mainly of outside directors undertook the core 
functions of monitoring. 
The optional approach of the 2002 reforms reflected the policymakers’ 
ambivalence about American-style corporate governance.73 In fact, the impact of 
the 2002 reforms has been limited. The newly introduced committee structure was 
adopted by a very small number of Japanese companies. As late as 2014, only 1.7 
percent of listed companies had adopted this system.74 The link between the outside 
directors and good corporate performance remained elusive.75 Sony, for instance, 
was the first Japanese company to introduce independent executive directors 
voluntarily in 1996. Following the 2002 reforms, Sony formally introduced the new 
committee structure, but its performance remained dismal through the 2000s and 
well into the mid-2010s. As another example, Toshiba led corporate governance 
reforms by introducing executive officers in 1998, nomination and compensation 
committees in 2000, and three outside directors in 2001. However, it was revealed 
in 2015 that the company had engaged in fraudulent accounting for years under the 
top executives’ directions. The company’s difficulties were often contrasted with 
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Economic Analysis, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 135–47 (Dan Puchniak et al. eds., 2017). 
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Exceptions to Commercial Code Concerning Audit, etc. Act], Law No. 22 of 1974, arts. 21-5 et seq, 
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75. For empirical studies, see Goto et al., supra note 71, at 151–60. 
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the steady performance of Toyota Corporation, which said it had no intention of 
introducing outside directors. Bruce Aronson observed in a careful case study, 
however, that Toyota later introduced independent directors in response to a 
governance crisis wrought by inadvertently accelerating vehicles.76 
Deregulatory and enabling reform of 1990s-2000s was followed by greater use 
of soft-law in the mid-2000s onward. At the time, the number of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) were rising, and some of the management actions such as 
takeover defenses and management buy-outs (MBO) attracted public attention.77 In 
order to ensure fairness, the Takeover Defense Guidelines were published in 2005,78 
and the Management Buy-Out (MBO) Guidelines in 2007,79 under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).80 Both guidelines followed 
recommendations made by a group of legal and policy experts, who borrowed 
heavily from the Delaware takeover doctrine.81 However, the experts’ report 
emphasized that defensive measures should be implemented to protect corporate 
value, a concept that is ambiguous enough to be interpreted either as referring to 
shareholder interests or the wider interests of the entire body of stakeholders.82 In 
Curtis Milhaupt’s words, the Guidelines “adroitly straddled the conceptual divide 
between the shareholder orientation of U.S. corporate law and the more 
stakeholder- (particularly employee-) oriented approach of post-war Japanese 
corporate governance practices.”83 
Generally, Japanese judges do not display the ambition of the Delaware 
Chancellor in leading the debate on corporate governance, and the general public 
does not expect them to do so, either.84 Nevertheless, the court has been willing to 
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accommodate changes that are thought to be desirable. During the 2000s, the 
Japanese courts adopted the American business judgment rule, with certain 
modifications to retain a limited scope of review as to the substance of the board’s 
business judgment.85 As will be seen later, the Japanese courts also played a conduit 
role, adjudicating in line with the above-mentioned Guidelines.86 
B.  Pension Funds and Related Areas 
The expansion of fiduciary norms was not confined to corporate law. In 1999, 
echoing Tamar Frankel’s thesis, Norio Higuchi declared the arrival of the fiduciary 
era in Japan as a necessary consequence of the growing specialization and 
interdependence within the modern society, whereby virtually every member of the 
society relied on the services and expertise of others.87 Indeed, fiduciary rules 
regulating conflict-of-interest transactions were introduced along with standard 
duty-of-loyalty provisions in wide areas of law, including pensions,88 trusts,89 and 
nonprofits,90 as well as in the code of professional responsibilities applicable to 
lawyers.91 
However, the enforcement of fiduciary obligations remained challenging. In 
2011, an employee pension fund lost most of its assets, worth 200 billion yen, by 
following the advice of an investment consulting firm called AIJ to increase high-
risk investments through its Cayman Islands subsidiary. The trust bank had warned 
against this shift in investment strategy, but had failed to detect the massive 
falsification of accounting documentation in its custodial capacity. The pension 
fund sued the trustee bank, but the court rejected the claim and held that the trustee 
bank, acting under the statutory requirement to follow the pension fund’s 
investment policy, was not required to advise beyond its mandate with regard to the 
diversified investment.92 Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) anticipated the concentration in high-risk investments in a 
substantial part of the pension investment sector. In despair, the same Higuchi, who 
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thirteen years earlier had predicted the arrival of the fiduciary era, lamented that 
Japan was a society that knew no fiduciary law.93 
Another case involved a private pension fund, the All Japan Liquor Retailers 
Association. The head of the Association’s investment office lost almost 80 percent 
of pension assets, worth 18.5 billion yen, after investing in a fund that turned out to 
be run by British and South African fraudsters. In the criminal proceedings, the 
investment office head and his supervising director on the board were convicted. 
In the civil proceedings that followed, the Tokyo District Court found those 
presumably judgment-proof defendants liable but absolved the remaining directors 
because they owed no fiduciary duty to the policyholder and did not have sufficient 
expertise in the pension area.94 
These cases reflect a reality in which an increasingly large amount of working-
class assets was invested overseas, exposing them to new kinds of risk. Nonetheless, 
their trustees, their financial intermediaries, and their regulators struggled to live up 
to expectations, while case law development was slow in holding the relevant 
fiduciaries to account. It took several more years before the regulators began to 
direct their attention to the ultimate beneficiary at the end of the investment chains. 
C.  Post-Lehman Developments 
In 2008, the world was mired in a severe financial crisis following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Aside from its economic repercussions, the event 
brought about an important shift in the Japanese debate over the proper forms of 
corporate and market governance. Notably, the debate that had been dominated by 
the American hard-law model began to shift to the British soft-law style of a 
“comply or explain” approach.95 
In February 2014, the Japanese Stewardship Code was adopted under the 
auspices of the METI to encourage institutional investors to seek greater medium- 
to long-term investment returns for their clients and ultimate beneficiaries through 
constructive engagement with the companies in which they invested.96 Following 
the lead of the U.K. Stewardship Code, published in 2010 by the U.K. Financial 
Reporting Council, the Japanese Code adopted the non-mandatory “comply or 
explain” approach, urging institutional investors to engage with their investee 
companies and exercise their voting rights.97 The motive behind the Japanese move 
away from “short-termism,” however, may not have been the same as the one 
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originated in the U.K.98 The institutional investors’ engagement with the investee 
companies was meant not just for the prevention of myopic excessive risk taking, 
but also a key to achieving a long-term increase in corporate value in Japan. The 
expectation was that exhortation from the shareholders to bring higher returns 
would change the risk-averse mindset of the directors who tended to manage the 
company conservatively to avoid the risk of insolvency during the long recession 
known as the lost decades.99 This motive was apparent in an influential report 
published by Professor Kunio Ito and his fellow academic experts and 
representatives from institutional investors and the corporate sector in 2014.100 
While echoing the Kay Review’s emphasis on the promotion of dialogue between 
companies and institutional investors,101 the Ito Review stressed the importance of 
Japanese companies achieving a level of return on equity (ROE) that exceeded the 
cost of capital required by global investors.102 It recommended that Japanese 
companies should commit themselves to achieving a minimum ROE of eight 
percent as the first step in receiving recognition from global investors.103 
In parallel, there has been a renewed interest in the U.K.-style enlightened 
shareholder value.104 This approach may have been seen more conducive to 
Japanese corporate culture than the American approach that tends to focus on 
shareholder value. In 2015, following the U.K. Corporate Governance Code and 
tracking the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the FSA and Tokyo 
Stock Exchange published the Japanese Corporate Governance Code.105 
The Japanese Corporate Governance Code had a tangible impact on one 
policy area that had long been controversial in Japan: the introduction of outside 
directors. Principle 4 of the 2015 Code emphasized the need for independent and 
objective oversight of the directors. This was elaborated upon in Principle 4-8, 
which states that listed companies should appoint at least two independent outside 
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directors. While only 21.5 percent of the companies listed in Section 1 of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange satisfied this provision in 2014, the number steadily increased to 
93.4 percent by 2019.106 Principle 4-8 also included a more ambitious target of filling 
at least one-third of each board with independent directors. Although this was a 
more difficult target to achieve, the figure steadily improved, from 6.4 percent in 
2014 to 43.6 percent in 2019.107 
This was a remarkable achievement given that no provision of the Companies 
Act required a single outside director on a board until 2019.108 In fact, the 2014 
amendment to the Companies Act avoided mandating the appointment of an 
outside director, requiring instead that all listed companies without outside directors 
provide reasons at their annual shareholders’ meetings. It should be noted, though, 
that the 2015 Code was part of a series of moves on the part of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange to nudge listing companies toward enhanced independent monitoring. In 
2009, the Tokyo Stock Exchange amended its listing rules to require listed 
companies to adopt either an independent director or independent statutory 
auditor. The 2012 amendment urged listed companies to introduce an independent 
director rather than a corporate auditor. 
Beyond this, the empirical evidence is sparse as to the impact of the 
Stewardship and Corporate Governance Codes. In 2017, a sequel to the 2014 Ito 
Report was published. The report, commonly known as Ito Review 2.0, 
acknowledged that the earlier report’s aim of achieving an 8.0 percent ROE had 
been frustrated and that Japanese companies’ overall ROE had remained lower than 
those of American and European companies.109 
Meanwhile, the term “fiduciary duty” began to seep into the broader area of 
financial regulation. In 2014, the Financial Services Authority used the term for the 
first time in its General Principles on the Monitoring of Financial Institutions, a 
guidance document that sets out the FSA’s stance in its inspection and oversight 
activities over financial institutions.110 In 2016, the Japanese Cabinet declared in a 
document entitled Japan Revitalization Strategy that the “Financial System Council will 
consider necessary actions to ensure that all entities engaged in formation of assets 
by customers, such as development, distribution and management of instruments, 
and asset management, will fulfill their fiduciary duties (customer-oriented 
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management of operations).”111 Following the Council’s recommendations, the 
FSA published “Customer-first Business Practices” in 2017, setting out seven 
principles to encourage financial services providers to develop best practices to 
serve their customers’ best interests.112 The document expressly stated that these 
principles were not legally binding but created an expectation that any financial 
institution deviating from any of the principles should fully explain why. 
As the standard-based fiduciary norm was accepted by academics, practicing 
lawyers, market participants, and regulators, the court gradually warmed up to the 
use of duty-of-loyalty terminology. An early and subtle example was Takada v. Nihon 
setsubi, K.K., in which the Tokyo High Court ruled that a former director had 
breached his duty of loyalty when he lured an employee from the plaintiff company, 
where he had previously served as a director, to a new company he had 
established.113 This was the very first case in which a Japanese court used the duty 
of loyalty independently of the duty of care of the faithful manager.114 More 
recently, the Supreme Court held that the managing partner of a silent partnership 
is liable to the silent partners for engaging in a conflict-of-interest transaction when 
subscribing for the bond issued by the company it had established, which in turn 
purchased shares in another company from the managing partner and his brother. 
The applicable statute did not contain any specific duty-of-care or duty-of-loyalty 
provision, but that did not stop the court from finding the managing partner liable 
either in tort or for failure to exercise due care.115 
In addition, echoing the recent soft-law approach in corporate governance, 
some judicial decisions adjudicated M&A disputes in line with the non-binding 
guidelines, explicitly referring to the Takeover Defense Guideline116 and the MBO 
Guideline.117 Further, in In Re Jupiter Telecommunication,118 the Supreme Court 
considered the fairness of pricing in a two-step going-private transaction in which 
the tender offer by the majority shareholder was followed by a squeeze-out of 
minority shareholders by cash payments. While noting the inherent conflict of 
interests between the acquirer and the minority shareholders, the Court held that it 
would uphold the price determined by the parties so long as measures were in place 
to ensure that the decision-making process was not arbitrary and that the tender 
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offer was conducted through “procedures generally considered fair.”119 The Court 
then overruled the lower court decision that ordered payment of a price 
independently adjudicated as representing a fair value, although it did not elaborate 
on what constitutes the proper measures and procedures generally considered fair, 
other than to approve the procedure taken in the instance case. Going forward, the 
fairness of procedures will likely be measured with reference to the 2007 MBO 
guidelines,120 which were updated in June 2019.121 
The last cases appear to represent a recent pattern in the evolution of Japanese 
fiduciary norms in the area of corporate law: as the non-statutory soft-law norms 
published and updated by quasi-public bodies gradually become a part of market 
practices, they receive careful approval through case law. Although the reported 
cases rarely mention comparative or overseas sources, the underlying fiduciary 
norms have increasingly become reflective of the corporate governance and 
stewardship principles that are prevailing overseas. 
D.  Family, Guardianship, and Succession Law 
The global and transnational transformation of fiduciary law is beginning to 
influence some of the areas that have heretofore been less susceptible to such 
changes than those in relation to corporate or investment transactions: family, 
guardianship, and succession. These changes have taken place against a backdrop 
of the rapid aging of Japanese society and increasingly ready access to global 
financial services. 
In 1999, extensive statutory revisions were implemented to reform the age-old 
guardianship system.122 As the use of guardianship increased, however, family 
courts around the country experienced serious difficulties in monitoring guardians 
and preventing abuse. In a controversial case, a local family court overlooked abuse 
that was so blatant that the High Court ordered the state to compensate for the 
loss.123 From these experiences, family courts began to avoid appointing family 
members as guardians and shifted to professional guardians, such as lawyers, judicial 
scriveners, and social welfare professionals. Nevertheless, this move was unpopular, 
not just because it made the process costly and time consuming but also because 
family members lost control over the welfare of their loved ones. Facing criticism, 
the judiciary again changed course in 2019, when the Supreme Court issued a 
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statement to urge family courts to appoint more family members to serve as 
guardians.124 
The Japanese are also warming up to the use of sophisticated means of asset 
management and succession planning. Today, those who are exploring greater 
dispositive freedom in tax-efficient means are not limited to a handful of the super-
rich but also include a broader middle-class cohort of Japan’s aging population. 
Beginning in 2010, they began to use trusts as an alternative to guardianship and 
wills, with a member of the settlor’s family often serving as the trustee. This was a 
major shift in practice, since trusts have long been used almost exclusively for 
commercial and investment purposes, with trust banks serving as trustees.125 In 
2018, the Tokyo District Court handed down its first decision on the interaction 
between forced heirship and trusts, one of the most contentious issues in the civil 
law jurisdiction that introduced common-law trusts.126 
At the moment, the reported cases mostly involve decisions on the basic 
questions that have arisen in the shifting landscape of family and succession 
practice, and the courts have yet to rule on delicate issues involving fiduciary duties 
and obligations.127 Nonetheless, a greater number of trustees and guardians are 
beginning to operate in an inevitably conflicted position, in which they act as 
fiduciaries while expecting to benefit as beneficiaries or potential heirs. In the 
absence of credible bodies to announce guiding principles, the court is in the 
position of adjudicating and developing fiduciary norms in both guardian and trust 
contexts. 
Furthermore, disputes involving cross-border elements may affect the 
evolving fiduciary norms within the law of succession and trusts. At present, Japan 
is not a signatory to the Hague Trust Convention, and no reported case has dealt 
with the recognition or enforcement of foreign trusts. Nonetheless, in a recent case 
involving a joint account created at Bank of Hawaii, the Tokyo District Court gave 
an indication that the parties’ choice of law in an overseas will-substitute would be 
respected against the heir’s claim against the estate, so long as it did not violate the 
public policy of Japanese succession law, such as forced heirship rules.128 Here 
again, in a cross-border context, a Japanese court is likely to be asked to decide on 
the fiduciaries’ role and duties, which may in turn touch on some elements of the 
transnational fiduciary order. 
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IV. JAPANESE, ASIAN, AND TRANSNATIONAL FIDUCIARY ORDERS 
We have seen in Part III that during the past few decades, the notion of 
fiduciary duty began to apply in increasingly broad areas of Japanese law, requiring 
a person entrusted with discretionary power to act for the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, domestic policymaking began to synchronize with various overseas 
fiduciary initiatives, though the motives sometimes diverged from those of the 
original initiatives. Here, it is worth pausing to consider the conditions that paved 
the way for this final phase in the transnationalization of fiduciary law in Japan 
because they provide the ground for putting the Japanese experience in a broader 
regional context in East Asia. The Japanese reception of fiduciary law and its 
experience with transnationalization have contributed to the formation of an Asia-
specific dynamic in shaping the relevant areas of the law. At the same time, the 
greater globalization in various parts of East Asia has created a new dimension of a 
transnational dynamic in the evolution of fiduciary law. 
A. Transnationalization from the Japanese Perspective 
One of the factors that prepared for the greater transnationalization of the 
fiduciary law was the change in the pattern of social interactions. Tamar Frankel has 
explained the rise in the fiduciary law in terms of the shift in social relations from 
being status-based to more particularized and functional relations of reliance, 
although she was careful to note the danger of overgeneralization.129 In Japan, the 
status-based notion of loyalty held sway for a long time, but it gradually lost grip as 
the influence of the household was lost and corporate dominance through lifetime 
employment declined toward the end of the twentieth century.130 The greater 
mobility of the population both within and across national borders, coupled with 
the aging of society, has accelerated the trend in recent years. 
Similarly, the fiduciary norms have shifted from being rule-based to being 
standard-based.131 In the Japanese context, this has meant a shift from the 
predominance of individualized rules derived from the civil law tradition to a 
gradual acceptance of the American duty of loyalty across many areas of law. Note 
that a similar shift took place in many common-law jurisdictions, where more 
theorizing of fiduciary law occurred toward the end of the twentieth century.132 
European civil law jurisdictions have also begun to see a unified conception of 
“fiduciary-like duties” in recent years.133 
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There has also been a shift in regulatory approach, from hard law to soft law. 
In the Japanese context, ambivalence about American-style fiduciary governance, 
which emphasizes shareholder primacy and court enforcement, has led to the 
adoption of an optional approach to corporate governance.134 The U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code and Stewardship Principles were more attractive because they 
allowed for divergence from the standard model. At the same time, when pressed 
to explain the deviation, many Japanese companies chose to adopt the standard 
model. According to an OECD report, nearly all forty-seven jurisdictions surveyed 
had a national code or principle of corporate governance, with the notable 
exceptions of China, India, and the U.S.135 Stewardship Codes have been introduced 
in at least ten jurisdictions and in the EU, and investor-led best practice guidance 
has been introduced in at least nine jurisdictions including the U.S.136 
On a substantive front, there was greater appreciation of the trust and its 
equivalents in civil law jurisdictions around the turn of the last century.137 
Comparative inquiry in both common law and civil law jurisdictions have shown 
that trusts can be understood to constitute a part of organizational law that enable 
asset partitioning and fiduciary governance.138 Although Continental European 
jurisdictions were slow to introduce trusts in non-commercial settings, that did not 
detract from the realization that trusts can be used as an alternative to guardianship 
and testamentary instruments.139 All this has led to an understanding of fiduciary 
law as generally applicable across different areas of law where, whether in common-
law or civil jurisdictions, a person entrusted with certain properties or powers is 
under an obligation to act solely in the interests of the beneficiary and to avoid, or 
at least manage, any conflicts of interest. 
Finally, the increasing movement of people, services, and capital across 
national borders cannot be ignored. In the Japanese context, sensitivities to 
corporate governance arose with the rise of foreign investors in Japanese capital 
markets and the concomitant decline of cross-holding among domestic 
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companies.140 The share of foreign market value ownership increased steadily from 
4.7 percent in 1990, hitting a peak of 31.7 percent in 2014.141 Japan’s state pension 
fund, the Government Pension Investment Fund, is the largest in the world, with 
total invested assets of approximately ¥159,215,400 million as of 2019.142 The 
foreign equity ratio within its investment portfolio gradually increased from 9.81 
percent in 2009 to 25.53 percent in 2019, and the foreign bond ratio rose from 10.82 
percent to 16.95 percent during the same period.143 To the extent that similar 
phenomena can be observed in other jurisdictions, it is easy to see that policymakers 
are driven to enhance a common understanding of fiduciary norms across 
jurisdictional borders. 
B. The East Asian Context 
The Japanese experience can be put into a broader regional context. 
Historically, Japan led the way in introducing the Western legal system and ideas to 
East Asia. After World War II, Japanese economic development provided a model 
for many developing economies in the region.144 Nevertheless, these influences 
have been coupled with the history of colonial rule and wartime aggression that is 
still contentious in the region; consequently, Japan has played, at best, a modest role 
in promoting legal unification or transnational ordering.145 In general, Japan has 
long maintained a positive stance in relation to transnational legal ordering, often 
with the intention of deriving informed suggestions for potential domestic 
reform.146 
Of the East Asian jurisdictions, South Korea and Taiwan have followed a 
pattern of legal development that is most similar to that of Japan. In both 
jurisdictions, the civil law tradition serves as the basis of private law in the form of 
a Civil Code and Commercial Code. The common-law influence arrived later 
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through trust legislation,147 securities regulation,148 and the corporate governance 
doctrine. As in Japan, inscribing fiduciary norms into the foundations of civil law 
has often been seen as a major comparative law conundrum. In the area of corporate 
law, for example, the Taiwanese Company Act was amended in 2001 to introduce 
fiduciary duties by specifically providing for the duty of loyalty.149 Nonetheless, 
lawyers in Taiwan candidly admit, as did their Japanese counterparts, that the 
implication of such an amendment is unclear.150 
On the corporate governance front, both South Korea and Taiwan 
traditionally relied on statutory auditors to monitor directors, but they have 
increased the presence of independent directors since the turn of century. In 2006, 
Taiwan adopted an optional approach to the introduction of outside directors, and 
a Financial Supervisory Commission gradually expanded the scope of listed 
companies and financial institutions subject to the compulsory rule of appointing 
independent directors.151 South Korea moved more decisively to introduce 
mandatory independent directors following the 1997 Financial Crisis and the bailout 
by the International Monetary Fund. Today, large companies and financial 
institutions in South Korea are required to have at least three independent directors 
who must constitute a majority of the board, although a statutory auditor remains 
an option for smaller companies.152 The development of the law and practice of 
trusts in South Korea and Taiwan also resembles Japanese patterns. Recent reforms 
have included the introduction of detailed fiduciary principles as well as greater 
proprietary remedies that are typically seen in common-law jurisdictions, although, 
here again, the impact of such provision is not entirely clear.153 
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By contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore have maintained English common law 
and have tracked major statutory reforms in the U.K. and other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. Unconstrained by the comparative law conundrum, these island cities 
have displayed agility in law reform, driven by entrepreneurial spirits typical of 
common-law lawyers. Even then, the transplant has not always been a perfect 
duplication. In the area of corporate law, Hong Kong codified the common-law 
duty of care but stopped short of codifying all fiduciary duties, showing some 
reluctance to accept the U.K.’s enlightened shareholder value approach.154 In 
Singapore, the dominance of state ownership and control co-existed with 
professional management on boards to create a unique pattern of corporate 
governance.155 In the area of trust law, the two jurisdictions have generally followed 
Anglo-Commonwealth trust doctrine and at the same time have competed with 
each other in offering global services using offshore trusts.156 
China is where the influences from the earlier two groups merge with each 
other and with its distinct local conditions. Chinese lawyers usually identify 
themselves as followers of the civil law tradition. At the same time, a large number 
of companies are cross-listed in stock exchanges in Hong Kong and Singapore. As 
a consequence, “Anglo-American jurisdictions install independent directors on the 
board, Germanic-Japanese jurisdictions provide a supervisory board or kansayaku, 
but listed companies in China must have both.”157 In the area of trusts, too, while 
the Chinese Trust Act of 2006 largely follows the structure of earlier legislation in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the trust services offered from Hong Kong and 
Singapore cater to the demands of wealthy Chinese capitalists.158 In addition, 
Chinese corporate and trust law reflects the distinct conditions prevailing in China, 
where many companies and trust investment companies are state-owned 
enterprises. The local government and sometimes the Communist Party intervene, 
either explicitly or implicitly, with specific political and social objectives.159 China 
has yet to embrace the voluntary-based Codes of Corporate Governance or 
Stewardship. 
Today the cross-border interaction of legal systems has become sufficiently 
complex and dynamic to turn a simple categorization—such as that offered 
above—into an overgeneralization. Asian dynamic could even offer an opportunity 
to question some of the broadly accepted notions of fiduciary models outside of 
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Asia. In the context of corporate governance, the prevailing pattern of concentrated 
share ownership in East Asia has called into question the efficacy of the 
independent director model that is based on the dispersed ownership that 
predominates in the U.S. and the U.K.160 In the area of trust law, wealthy Chinese 
individuals’ preference for retention of control over trust assets has led to domestic 
legislation that gives settlors strong power to influence the management of trusts.161 
A number of offshore jurisdictions have also reacted to such demands by 
introducing special trust legislation that allows settlors to reserve various powers 
over the management of trusts by the trustee.162 This development has called into 
question the basic notion of common-law trusts, in which the settlor was thought 
to drop out of the picture once the trust was created and a fiduciary relationship 
was established between the trustee and the beneficiaries.163 
Thus, the historical effort made by Japanese lawyers and policymakers to mix 
civil law influence with common-law inspiration prepared a fertile soil for the 
dynamic development of the regional fiduciary order. As each of the East Asian 
jurisdictions employed different comparative law strategies to pursue their 
respective desires to maintain economic competitiveness and attract cross-border 
investment, an increasingly dynamic evolution of the fiduciary order has developed. 
The greater presence of Asian jurisdictions has begun to affect the evolution of 
fiduciary norms in the region and beyond 
V. CONCLUSION 
One conspicuous feature of fiduciary law in theorizing the transnational legal 
order is that its core notion of loyalty has almost universal appeal as both a moral 
and a legal principle. This is so even though fiduciary law is often considered 
common law in origin. Although civil jurisdictions did not use the terms “fiduciary” 
or “duty of loyalty” in earlier times, their equivalents could readily be found in the 
form of the regulation of conflicted transactions by certain categories of entrusted 
persons.164 
Over the course of its history, Japanese law has been influenced at multiple 
levels by Western legal traditions. Although conceptual challenges and political 
tensions posed occasional difficulties, Japanese law has broadly embraced fiduciary 
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law as a set of ideas that transcend subject areas and national boundaries.165 In fact, 
national experiences suggest that a number of conditions have operated both inside 
and outside Japan to prepare fiduciary norms to increase their sensitivity to 
transnational developments. These conditions include a shift in social relations away 
from status, a greater use of standards in regulatory terms, an increased reliance on 
soft law as an enforcement approach, a greater awareness that principles derived 
from trust law can apply across various areas of law, and a certain vacillation in the 
intellectual leadership within common-law jurisdictions, as well as a greater volume 
of transactions across national borders.166 The relationship between legal norms and 
local morals is rather complex. One might surmise that local morals would gradually 
percolate into legal norms, but the Japanese experience is that the erosion of the 
traditional notion of loyalty in family and communal contexts has left a void that 
has been gradually filled by the fiduciary norms derived from modern and 
transnational sources of law.167 
Transnationalization does not automatically lead to the uniformity or the 
universal enforcement of fiduciary law.168 In contrast to many areas of law where 
transnational legal orders have been observed, fiduciary law appears to be lacking 
an effective institutional body that operates transnationally to drive harmonization 
and uniform enforcement. The OECD did promulgate the Principles of Corporate 
Governance and has issued reports that document the level and extent of 
compliance, but its role appears to be much more limited than, for instance, the 
Basel Committee’s role in banking regulation169 or the International Organization 
of Standardization’s role in industry regulation.170 The Japanese and East Asian 
experience has been that domestic policymakers often have different ideas than the 
overseas proponents of fiduciary regulations and that there are often gaps in the 
enforcement of the law.171 The greater use of optional regulations and a soft-law 
approach sometimes accommodated such divergences and gaps, but once the 
relevant transnational norms reached a certain level of acceptance, a number of 
domestic actors sometimes worked to harden the regulations, as in cases where the 
courts have adopted the norms as part of their judicial reasoning or the securities 
exchanges has turned them into a listing requirement.172 At the same time, such 
divergences and gaps at the regional level could provide an opportunity to 
reconsider the prevailing notion of fiduciary law.173 The Asian dynamic is such that 
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it might portend further shifts and transformations in the future of transnational 
fiduciary ordering. 
 
